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trade bloc to which a country belongs and the variation in income in the trade bloc also
encourage more rapid growth among member countries. We also find that omission any of
these international sources of growth biases the coefficients estimated on included regressors.
Keywords: Growth, trade barriers, trade blocs, FDI
JEL Classification: F15, F43
Acknowledgments: We thank Deng-Shing Huang, David Cook, and Henry Wan for useful comments, as well as
audience members at the Dynamics, Economic Growth, and International Trade, III conference in Taipei, Taiwan,
August 1998. FUnding from Purdue University's Center for Internationa Business Education and Research is gratefully
acknowledged.
Address: Department of Economics, Purdue University, W. Lafayette, IN 47907-1310
Phone: Haveman: (765) 494-6156; Lei: (765) 494-4505; Netz: (765) 494-4452; Fax: (765) 494-9658
E-mail: jon@haveman.orgj wenchieh..lei@mgmt.purdue.edu; netz@purdue.edu

INTERNATIONAL INTEGRATION AND GROWTH:
A SURVEY AND EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION
Jon D. Haveman, Vivian Lei, and Janet S. Netz

I. Introduction
In recent years there has been a renewed interest in studying the determinants of
growth given the divergence in per capita incomes across the nations of the world. Neoclassical growth theory, as formalized by Solow (1956) and Swan (1956), predicts that all
countries will converge to the same steady-state growth rate. Given that this prediction
does not square with the observed divergence in growth rates, other.;; have developed theories
explaining growth without the troubling convergence prediction. 1 While endogenous growth
theories consider a variety of mechanisms by which growth can be sustained, we concentrate
on how international interactions contribute to growth. 2 We are interested in international
integration, generally, including trade, foreign direct investment, and the formation of trade
blocs.
We begin by briefly illustrating the theoretical work and surveymg the empirical
work that directly relates international integration to growth. 3 We empirically analyze the
effects of different types of international interactions on growth. Our paper contributes to
the literature by dis~riminating between the different channels through which growth has
been affected by international integration as well as by integrating the several channels
through which international interactions may influence growth. Most, if not all, empirical
See the symposium on growth theory in the Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1994, for an overview of the
development of the theory.
2 We use the term international integration to broadly refer to any type of international interaction. In particular,
we are not limiting the discussion to the formation of trade blocs, though we include trade blocs as one type of
international interaction in which we are interested.
3 Long and Wong, 1997, provide a theoretical framework which can capture most endogenous growth theories.
They then apply the framework to capture the theoretically suggested effects of trade on growth. Walz,
1997a, surveys the theoretical work on the effect of international integration, including trade, on growth. To
our knowledge, no comprehensive survey of the empirical effects of international interactions, including trade,
foreign direct investment, and preferential trading arrangements, has been written.
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work focuses on one international interaction at a time. Because measures of international
interactions are highly and statistically significantly correlated, omitting any of them will
lead to a biased estimate of the influence of those that are included in the regression.
In .general, we do find that increased international integration does lead to faster
growth. In particular, increases in inward FDI, increases in the trade share of GDP, increases
in exports to richer countries, being a member of a trade bloc, increases in the aggregate
size of the other members of the trade bloc, and increases in the dispersion of income of .
trade bloc members lead to increased growth. Two puzzles emerge. The more home bias a
country demonstrates and the more imports from rich countries, the lower the growth rate.

II. Theoretical Predictions
In this section we discuss some of the ways in which endogenous growth theory and
trade theory have come together to highlight the mechanisms by which international interactions can influence growth. Trade theory shows that countries gain from trade, in the
sense of achieving higher income, by reallocating scarce resources to those sectors in which
a country has a comparative advantage. 4 Endogenous growth theory attempts to explain
growth while endogenizing technological change. When integrated, the two theories shed
light on how trade, trade policy, and investment affect growth. We highlight here endogenous growth models of open economies. The papers incorporate the insights of both bodies
of literature: growth may be sustained by dynamic comparative advantage,S technology
diffusion,6 learning-by-doing, spillovers,7 and economies of scale. Several survey papers focusing on theoretical work on growth that incorporates international interactions have been
4 Baldwin, 1992b, shows that changes in trade policy affect the accumulation of factors of production, in particular
human and physical capital, and thus can affect growth rates.
S Standard trade theory, since static, shows only that trade can increase the level of a country's income. Dynamic
comparative advantage refers to the reallocation of resources towards industries that exhibit spillovers of some
sort (typically the R&D industry), in which case resource reallocation can lead to a change in the growth rate
as well as in the level of income. See Grossman and Helpman, 1991a chapter 9 and 1994, for a discussion of
dynamic comparative advantage.
6 Keller, 1997, finds strong empirical evidence that trade leads to technology diffusion.
7 Coe, Helpman, and Hoffmaister, 1997, find empirical evidence that R&D spillovers from industrial countries to
developing countries are substantial.

2

written, including those cited in footnote 3. Therefore, we limit the discussion to several
papers that provide examples of the ways in which international interactions may influence
growth rather than surveying the vast literature on the topic.
Grossman and Helpman (1991a) discuss three channels, in addition to dynamic comparative advantage, through which international integration might affect a country's growth
rate. First, international integration increases the opportunities for communication and thus
facilitates the transmission of technology. Second, increasing international competition can
encourage entrepreneurs to engage in more R&D activities, while at the same time reducing
duplication of research effort. Finally, the size of the market is expanded with freer trade, potentially increasing investment activity. Grossman and Helpman (1991b) develop a dynamic
general equilibrium model to discuss the knowledge spillovers through which trade improves
a country's growth performance. A homogeneous, traded final good is produced by perfectly
competitive firms using labor and non-traded, horizontally differentiated intermediate goods
that require R&D to produce new varieties. Productivity of R&D is linked to the stock of
knowledge capital, which depends not only upon domestic efforts on product development,
but also upon "
the number of contacts that local firms have with the international researc;:h
and business communities. The number of contacts is assumed to be positively related to the
extent of international trade in commercial commodities. Thus, trade, and trade policies,
can affect a country's growth. 8
In their model, the effect of trade policy on the long-run growth rate depends on parameters in the production function. For example, in the case where the relative importance
of spillover effects from international trade declines over time, trade policy can only influence
the rate of knowledge accumulation and growth in the transition period. A policy such as
a tariff, imposed by either the horne or the foreign government, can reduce the chance of
interacting with foreign firms, so that growth will slow during the transition period towards
the steady state. However, in the long run, the volume of trade (and hence trade policy) has
8 Walz, 1997b, develops a model based on Grossman and Helpman, 1991, but incorporating foreign direct investment as the mean by which technology is diffused. He shows that countries more open to FDI have higher
growth rates.
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no effect on the steady-state growth rate. On the other hand, in the case where the volume
of trade grows at the same rate as the number of varieties of the differentiated industrial
products, Grossman and Helpman prove that a reduction in the size of trade barriers will
increase the ratio of the cumulative volume of trade relative to the number of varieties in
the long run; this accelerates technological progress and therefore leads to a higher growth
f

rate in the steady state. Thus, where trade and trade barriers do have an effect on growth,
more international interactions (higher trade volumes, lower trade barriers) increase growth..
Ben-David and Loewy (1997, 1998) also suggest that trade may lead to economic
growth by facilitating the diffusion of knowledge and knowledge accumulation among countries. They assume that the extent of knowledge spillovers between two countries is an
increasing function of the volume of trade between them. As predicted by Grossman and
Helpman, Ben-David and Loewy show that a unilateral tariff reduction by a single country
would cause all trading countries to grow faster in the steady-state. In addition, Ben-David
and Loewy show that removing or reducing tariffs improves growth by directly changing
market clearing prices and thus consumption. Consequently, trade policy has an indirect
effect on the extent of knowledge spillovers and accumulation.
Another mechanism through which international integration can contribute to growth,
other than the knowledge spillover effect, is illustrated by Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991).9
They emphasize the pure scale effect through which integration by two similar countries
affects long-run growth. 10 They distinguish two types of R&D in which innovation occurs to
differentiated capital inputs: a knowledge-driven specification and a lab equipment specification. The first type of R&D is characterized by the assumption that the R&D sector uses
human capital and the existing stock of knowledge as inputs. Unskilled labor and physical
capital, which also enter the production function of the manufacturing sector, have no impact on the accumulation of knowledge. In the lab equipment specification, R&D is assumed

9

Peretto, 1996, builds an alternative model of integration that supports the general insights of Rivera-Batiz and
Romer.
10 Rivera-Batiz and Romer focus on similar countries in order to isolate the effect of economies of scale from the
effect of gains arising from comparative advantage.
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to use the same inputs as the manufacturing produCt and knowledge perse has no value.
Complete integration can raise the growth rate and improve welfare in both countries,
regardless of whether R&D per se has production value. However, for partial integration,
Rivera-Batiz and Romer show that trade in goods alone without exchanging ideas has no
effect on the long-run growth rate for both countries in the knowledge-driven R&D model.
The intuition behind this finding is straightforward. Without exchanging ideas, the stock of
knowledge in both countries remains the same, and there will be no technological progress
in either of these countries. Therefore, international trade can only have a level effect on
the steady state without affecting the growth performance of a country. On the other hand,
since trade in goods has already provided an incentive for researchers in different countries
to specialize in different designs, allowing trade in ideas can take advantage of the fact that
the worldwide stock of knowledge is twice as large as the stock in each individual country,
and hence the productivity of human capital in the research sector and the growth rate of
output can be increased. 11
Rivera-Batiz and Romer conclude that it is not knowledge spillovers that cause the
fundamental of long-run growth, but rather it is the increasing returns to scale, arising from
the enlarged market size, in the production of new designs that result in a higher growth rate
for two identical, integrated countries. Given that the production function of new designs
exhibits increasing returns to scale, trade in goods can therefore provide the incentive to
avoid redundant effort from operating two research sectors in isolation. Additionally, trade
in ideas along communications networks in the knowledge-driven model and trade in capital
goods in the lab equipment model can serve the function that ideas discovered in one country
can be available for use in research in both countries.
Although Rivera-Batiz and Romer show that trading commodities alone between two
similar countries can have no growth effect in the knowledge-driven model, it can also be
11 With the above predictions, however, we should not conclude that trade in goods can only have level effects
and that trade in ideas raises the growth rate in the long run. For example, in the lab equipment model, flows
in goods alone can have both level and growth effects by causing a higher interest rate and a higher savings
rate.
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shown that this equilibrium is not stable in the case where two countries slightly differ in the
initial stock of knowledge. Devereux and Lapham (1994) adopt the same type of model and
prove that the symmetric balanced growth path can never be attained as long as the initial
stocks of knowledge are not identical across two countries. 12 Specifically, trading goods
alone without exchanging ideas will eventually cause a country with a relatively small share
in the initial world stock of designs to specialize in producing manufacturing goods and a
country with a larger share to diversify between manufacturing and R&D. These findings by .
Devereux and Lapham reinforce the importance of trade in commodities 'and the role played
by comparative advantage in the process of income growth when two countries integrate with
each other.
We thus see a variety of ways in which international interactions can affect growth.
What hypotheses can we take from these stylized models to the "real" world? Since one role
international interactions play is to diffuse technology, increased trade and increased foreign
direct investment should increase growth. Rivera-Batiz and Romer's model also suggests
that the establishment of a trade bloc, and the degree of integration attained within the
trade bloc, could, in addition to contributing to technology diffusion, cause rationalization
to occur in the R&D sectors, also leading to higher growth.

III. Empirical Literature
We now survey the empirical literature relating international integration to growth.
Edwards (1993) provides a useful survey of empirical studies that largely predate the development of the new endogenous growth models. This work generally focuses on developing
countries and the age-old question of whether a country should develop via export promotion
or import substitution. The modern empirical literature has stepped away from developing
countries to examine linkages between international interactions and growth. As discussed
above, there are many avenues through which international interactions can affect growth
12 Walz, 1998, considers the effect of an enlargement of a common market to a third, technologically lagging,
country, and finds that enlargement leads to increased growth for all members. Growth in the original members
is spurred because they can reallocate resources towards their dynamic sector.
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in a country or set of countries. Unfortunately, the majority of empirical work has typically
been narrow in focus, addressing only a single issue rather than all of the possible interactions that may lead to growth. Accordingly, we divide this section into three subsections:
trade and openness, foreign direct investment, and preferential trading arrangements.

Trade and Openness
Perhaps the most empirically studied issue relating to growth and international interactions is trade and openness. The most commonly used variables have been the share
of exports in GDP (or growth of exports) or the share of exports and imports in GDP.13
Openness is a catchall for the transmission of growth facilitators into a country. That is, the
more a country trades, relative to its size, the more likely it is to experience the benefits of
international interactions. 14 To the extent that this raw measure is capable of capturing the
complicated issues raised by the new growth theories, this is a reasonable approach. These
studies typically find a positive relationship between the trade share and growth. Criticisms
of these studies include the robustness of the results, the identical treatment of imports
and exports, and the endogeneity of trade flows or their correlation with other pro-growth
policies.
Because export and trade shares may not capture the degree to which a country is
"open," given that trade volume is determined by a number of characteristics beyond trade
policy, many studies have examined measures of the degree to which a country is open. 15 In
one of the most comprehensive treatments of the issue of openness, Harrison (1996) considers
a number of more specific measures of openness over a sample of developing countries. Her
openness indicators include: an annual index of trade liberalization based on exchange rate
13

For example, Feder, 1983, and Kormendi and Mequire, 1985, use measures of exports, while Sinha and Sinha,
and Harrison, 1996, use measures of total trade share. Edwards, 1993, surveys cross-sectional studies of
the effects of exports on growth. Levine and Renelt, 1992, note that similar results obtain with both measures.
14 Recall that several models suggest that the higher the number of transactions with foreigners, the more transmission of technology, and hence the more growth, occurs.
15 Coe and Helpman, 1995, present a model of R&D spillovers in which a country benefits for foreign R&D activity
the more open is the country.

1996,
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and commercial policies (from Papageorgiou, Michaely, and Choksi, 1991); another based on
tariffs and non-tariff barriers (from Thomas, Halevi, and Stanton, 1991); the black-market
premium; the share of trade in GDP (the usual openness measure); movements toward international prices; a modified version of the price distortion index used in Dollar (1991);
the indirect bias against agriculture from industrial sector protection; and the overvaluation
of the exchange rate. Generally speaking,· the results show movements toward openness
positively affect growth, while greater distortions reduce economic growth. Edwards (1992)
instead adopts indices of openness and intervention in trade based on Leamer's (1988) approach to predicting trade. 16 In essence, the openness and intervention indices are based
on deviations of observed trade flows and trade intensities from their predicted value. He
too finds broad support that more openness leads to higher growth rates on a sample of
developing countries. Wolf (1993) develops an index of openness based on the difference
between actual trade and trade levels predicted by a factor endowments model of trade. He
also finds that openness lep,ds to higher growth rates. 17
Frankel and Romer (1996) focus on the potential endogeneity of the trade share and
other more direct measures of openness, such as trade barriers. They note that countries
with liberal international trade policies are likely to be those with domestic policies that are
also conducive to growth. In this case, measures of the policy stance and trade volumes may
reflect variables omitted from the income equation rather than the effects of international
trade.

Their approach is to instrument for trade using the geographic component of a

countries trade from a common gravity equation; they rightly point out that geographic
isolation is unlikely to influence a country's income other than by reducing its interactions
with other countries. They continue to find a significant impact of trade on growth, and
suggest that studies that do not account for endogeneity understate the magnitude of the
16 Harrison, 1996, and Pritchett, 1991, note that Leamer's openness measure is inversely related to other measures
of openness, a troubling result. Levine and Renelt note that Leamer's openness index is positively related to
his distortions index. It is thus not clear what Leamer's indices are measuring.
17 Others who consider alternative measures include: Fischer, 1993, includes black market premium; Knight,
Loayza, and Villanueva, 1993, include measures of outward-oriented trade policies; and Lee, 1993, looks at
tariff rates and black market premia. In general, these studies also find support for the idea that countries that
are more open grow faster.
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effect. 18 ,19 Van den Berg (1996) tackles the simultaneity issue by adopting a time series
approach to simultaneously estimating growth, export share, import share, and investment
share for a variety of Latin American countries. When significant, the effect of export and
import share is positive; when both are significant for a country, the effect of exports is
generally of larger magnitude than the effect of imports.
Levine and Renelt (1992) find that the common favorable relationship between trade
and growth is not robust to changes in the broader model specification. They consider the
robustness of export share, import share, Leamer's indices of openness and of distortions,
the black market premium, and Dollar's index of real-exchange rate distortion. Under an
extreme bounds test for robustness, they reject robustness for all measures. 20 Levine and
Renelt's robustness criteria is severe, prompting Sala-i-Martin (1997) to consider a more
relaxed definition of robustness. He finds that trade share is not robust, but also finds that
an alternative measure of openness, "Number of Years an Economy Has Been Open Between
1950 and 1990," is robustly positive and significant. In addition, Roubini and Sala-i-Martin
(1991) note that Levine and Renelt allow the sample to change as different variables are
included in the model. (The sample changes due to different missing values for different
regressors.) Hence, while the coefficient on an openness variable may become insignificant
when another variable is added to the specification, it is unclear whether the insignificance
arises from the new specification or the new estimating sample. We limit our analysis to the
same set of observations for all model specifications in order to avoid this problem.
\

Foreign Direct Investment
The role of FDI in the growth process has long been a topic of intense debate. Until
relatively recently, however, there has been very little empirical analysis of the issue. The
18 Their approach of course does not allow them to address the issue of trade policy.
19 Several studies in the development literature consider the issue of endogeneity of exports. See, for example, Lee
and Cole, 1994, who also find that the effect of trade is understated when endogeneity is present.
20 In particular, when they include investment share in the regressions, openness is not robustly related to growth.
Therefore, they suggest that investment is the channel through which trade influences growth or convergence.
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recent developments in the growth theory, discussed above, have provided a convenient
framework in which to pursue empirical work. Accordingly, the evidence of the impact of
FDI on growth is expanding rapidly. To date, however, the evidence is not clear; there
is evidence of both a positive and a negative impact of FDI on growth in developing and
developed countries.
Borensztein, DeGregorio, and Lee (1995) present compelling results of the impact of
FDI from industrial countries to 69 developing countries. They find that FDI contributes
to growth in less developed countries primarily through technology transfer. Foreign investment is found to contribute relatively more to growth than domestic investment, presumably
by implementing technologies with higher productivity. They suggest an important caveat,
however, that a host country will only benefit in this way once it obtains a minimum threshold stock of human capital. In essence, without the resources necessary to exploit the new
technology on a wide scale, these productivity improvements will not be realized. A secondary finding is that foreign investment and domestic investment are complements. That
is, one dollar of foreign investment results in more than a one dollar increase in the level of
investment in the economy. This result suggests a significant complementarity effect between
foreign-owned production and domestically-owned firms.
Balasubramanyam, Salisu, and Sapsford (1996) test the hypothesis that trade and
inward FDI are complements for 46 developing countries. This is accomplished by dividing
the sample into countries pursuing an outward-oriented trade regime and those pursuing
import substitution policies. They find that FDI is more likely to be a contributor to
growth in countries pursuing outward-oriented (export promoting) policies, and that in fact
there is evidence that FDI is negatively. related to growth in countries pursuing import
substitution policies. A shortcoming of the conclusion centers around the distinct possibility
that the nature of the foreign direct investment may differ significantly in each case. In the
case of outward-oriented countries, the investment may well represent an the appropriate
specialization and utilization of abundant resources in the host country. FDI into countries
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pursuing import-substituting strategies, on the other hand, may represent efforts to jump
trade barriers. As such, this investment may embody technologies that are inappropriate for
the host country, resulting in an inefficient use of domestic resources. In addition, the model
does not include a measure of imports. If FDI is an effort to hurdle trade barriers, then FDI
and imports will be negatively correlated, and the included FDI measure will pick up both
the effect of FDI as well as the effect of imports. This too may explain the observed negative
coefficient, since high FDI may also proxy for low imports, negatively affecting growth. 21
Tsai (1994) considers the determinants of FDI as well as the impact of FDI on growth,
and finds that the positive impact of FDI, as commonly found in the absence of controlling
for the determinants of FDI, may be overstated. Saltz (1992) finds a negative relationship
between FDI and growth. The paper provides evidence of a negative relationship between
FDI and growth in third world countries, pointing to overly capital-intensive technologies,
monopolization and transfer pricing distortions resulting in the underutilization of labor. He
also suggests that direct investment may well cause more outflow of capital over time than
portfolio investment. 22
Much of the work on the effect of FDI on growth has concentrated on FDI from
developed countries into developing countries, and the results have been mixed. If Saltz is
correct that investment by developed countries embodies technology that is inappropriate
for developing countries, it suggests that FDI by similar countries may increase growth. We
therefore include FDI from all countries.

Preferential Trading Arrangements
An aspect of trade regimes that remains under-studied is that of preferential trading
arrangements: preferential market access or formal bilateral agreements. In particular, the
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) is often defended by the notion that granting
21 It is this type of bias that we hope to eliminate by adopting a comprehensive approach to measuring the effects
of international interactions on growth .
.22 Saltz also does not control for the influence of trade on growth.
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less developed countries preferential access to markets in developed countries will facilitate
growth among developing countries. 23 ,24 The theory underlying the growth effects of this type
of arrangement or other preferential arrangements is scant but growing, perhaps explaining
the dearth of empirical work. Of the small amount of empirical work that has been carried
out, the European Union has received the most attention.
Henrekson, Torstensson, and Torstensson (1997) study the growth effect of European
integration. They find that membership in the European Union or the European Free Trade
Area does significantly promote growth, and suggest that technology transfer is the main
mechanism through which EU and EFTA membership affect growth. 25

Landau (1995),

on the other hand, finds that membership in the EU does not contribute to growth of
member countries. He limits his sample to 17 wealthy OECD countries over 1950 to 1990;
even when limiting the analysis to the 22 OECD countries, Henrekson, et al. still find
a statistically significant positive effect of membership in the EU or EFTA.26 In related
work, Ben-David (1993 and 1996) studies the extent to which European integration has
promoted the convergence of incomes among EU countries.

His general finding is that

indeed, integration among European countries has brought about a general equalization of
incomes. One might presume that this implies faster growth for some countries and not
slower growth for others, in which case, this bloc has encouraged growth. 27
Little has been done on regional integration in general. De Melo, Montenegro, and
Panagariya (1992) estimate a growth equation including dummy variables for each trade
bloc; the only significant dummy is for the Southern African Customs Union in the 1960-72
23 The trade and static welfare effects of the GSP have been studied by Baldwin and Murray, 1977, Truett and
Truett, 1993, MacPhee and Oguledo, 1991, Tsanacas, 1989, MacPhee and Rosenbaum, 1989, Brown, 1987, and
others.
24 Similar arguments were made by France when insisting that former colonies receive preferential access to the
EEC under the Yaounde and Lome conferences.
25 Henrekson, et al. control for a large number of factors so that technological transfer is the only mechanism left
by which European integration can affect growth.
26 The difference in results is perhaps explained by the fact that Henrekson, et al., control for membership in the
ED or EFTA, while Landau only considers membership in the ED. Thus, Landau's control group will include
members of EFTA, which may explain why the coefficient on ED membership is insignificant.
27 Other studies of European integration also find support for the hypothesis that integration led to growth; see,
for example, Baldwin and Seghezza, 1996, Coe and Moghadam, 1993, Italianer, 1994, and Kokko, 1994.
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sub-period. Henrekson, et al., discuss why it is surprising that the influence of trade blocs
is insignificant as well as discussing possible explanations for the insignificant result. When
we adopt the De Melo, et al., approach, we too find generally insignificant results. However, alternative measures of regional integration, as discussed below, suggest that regional
integration does increase growth rates. Assane and Pourgerami (1994) study the influence
of the CFA monetary union on growth and find no direct result, though membership does
allow the countries to better control price fluctuations, possibly indirectly leading to higher
growth rates since it has been shown that lower inflation leads to increased growth.

IV. Empirical Framework
From the discussion above, we find that there are a number of disjointed pieces of
evidence that more international interactions lead to more trade. 28 It seems clear that different types of international interactions are related. For example, foreign direct investment
is thought to provide an alternative form of supplying a foreign country if tariffs are high,
and empirical evidence suggests that trade and FDI are complementary. In appendix tables,
we report statistically significant correlation coeffidents for correlations between the international variables we include in our study (table AI) and between the international variables.
and the other included regressors (table A2). Indeed, most of the correlations are significant.
Following in the same vein as Frankel and Romer (1996) and Levine and Renelt (1992), we
note that omission of some international variables may therefore bias the results on other
international variables. We therefore now turn to a more comprehensive investigation into
the effects of foreign direct investment, trade in general, and preferential trade arrangements.
By controlling for all forms of international interactions we can avoid the omitted variable
bias that results from a fragmented approach.
In our analysis, we adopt a panel data approach. 29 We borrow and extend Islam's
28 This is less true for the influence of membership in trade blocs on growth, where the evidence is rather mixed.
The empirical work in this area is much less advanced.
29 Islam, 1995, offers important caveats against a cross-sectional approach. One drawback is that it does not allow
for any differences in the production function across countries. Thus, we too adopt a panel data approach to
allow for differences in production functions captured via the country-specific effect.
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approach, arriving at the following estimating equation:
(1)

where dYit is the growth rate of GDP per capita from period t - 5 to period t; Yit-5 is country
i's per capita income in period t - 5; Cit is a set of control variables; Tit is a set of international
interaction variables; Vi is a country-specific error term; and Eit is the residual. 30 We assume
that continuous variables affect growth non-linearly, so they are entered as logs.
As controls, Cit, we use the log of investment and government spending shares of
GDP, the log of the population growth rate, and a measure of the initial stock of human
capital, all of which are common control variables in empirical growth studies. 31 We expect
that the coefficient on investment will be positive. The standard neo-classical explanation
is that increased investment raises the steady-state level of output per effective worker and
therefore raises the growth rate for a given starting value of GDP. The endogenous growth
explanation would rely on economies of scale and/or spillovers to explain the manner in which
increased investment leads to increased growth. The expectation of the sign of the coefficient
on government share is ambiguous, as it depends on what government is purchasing. 32 For
example, Barro (1997) considers government expenditures to proxy for outlays that do not
improve productivity. The larger the share of GDP spent on non-productive government
spending, the lower is expenditure on more productive endeavors and hence the lower is the
growth rate. On· the other hand, if the government is investing in education and infrastructure, or some other form of productive capital, the coefficient should be positive. We
expect a negative coefficient on the population growth rate. 33 In a neo-classical model, if the
population is growing, more of the economy's investment is used to provide capital for new
workers rather than to raise capital per worker. Thus, a higher rate of population growth
30 As explained below, we use 5-year periods as observations; thus, dYit is country i's growth rate over the 5-year
period prior to year t, and Yit-5 is the per capita income at the beginning of each 5-year period.
31 The investment and government spending shares are averages over the five year period; population growth rate
is measured over the five-year period; and human capital is measured at the beginning of each five-year period.
32 See Verspagen, 1992, who surveys growth theory with a focus on the role of government.
33 Ehrlich and Lui, 1997, discuss the impact of population growth on economic growth.
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has a negative effect on the steady-state level of output per effective worker. In addition, a
higher fertility rate means that increased resources must be devoted to child-rearing rather
than to production of goods, also reducing the growth rate. The measure of human capital
is the average number of years of secondary schooling of males aged twenty-five and over
the total population. 34 Based on the assumption that more human capital helps a country
absorb advanced knowledge from other countries, we expect that a higher initial stock of
human capital will cause a country to grow more quickly towards its long-run GDP per
capita.
A variety of measures of international interactions are included in the vector Tit.
They can be broadly classified as measuring foreign direct investment (FDI), general openness/trade, the existence of trade preferences, and membership in and characteristics of trade
blocs. FDI differs qualitatively from domestic investment in that it is often thought of as an
important channel through which advanced technology can be transferred from the source
country to the host country. Thus, we would expect a positive relationship between foreign
direct investment and growth. We measure FDI as the flow of all inward FDI as a share of
the recipient country's GDP.
To measure the extent to which a country is open, we use the "home bias" variable
suggested .by Wei (1996). Since a country's home bias is defined as its imports from itself in
excess of what it would have imported from an otherwise identical foreign country, it captures
all barriers to trade and thus is an inverse indicator of openness. 35 The hypothesis that

openness leads a country to grow faster implies that the coefficient on the home bias variable
in our estimating equation should be negative. We expect this general index of the degree
to which a country is closed to be advantageous given the data and measurement difficulties
in directly measuring barriers to trade, especially with regard to non-tariff barriers.
We measure the volume of international trade in two ways. First, we include the
34 We also considered the average number of years of secondary schooling of females and males and the proportion
of the population (males alone or females and males) that achieved secondary schooling. The results were
largely unchanged.
35 We estimate the level of imports from an identical foreign country by estimating a gravity equation to explain
bilateral trade flows, as documented in Wei, 1996.
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log of the trade share of GDP.36 Using total trade share makes two implicit assumptions.
First, it assumes that imports and exports affect growth identically. Second, 'it assumes
/'

that the source and destination countries is irrelevant. Both assumptions seem unlikely. For
example, endogenous growth theories that incorporate trade often model trade as facilitating growth via technology transfer. Then we might expect i~ports to have a larger impact
on growth than exports, as imports will embody technology in the product as well as the
"
transaction. In addition, Devereux and Lee (1998) and Baldwin (1992a) discuss the impact
of increased domestic competition due to imports on growth rates. Obviously this result
is absent for exports. Similarly, to stimulate growth the traded good must embody some
appropriate technology. Thus, we divide trade flows according to direction and according
their sources/destinations. We divide source and destination countries into three categories,
richer, same, and poorer countries, where the categories are defined as countries with higher-,
similar-, or lower-per capita GDP. 37 This division of trade according to the relative income
of the trade partner assumes that income is positively correlated with technology embodied
in goods and transactions. If trade primarily affects growth by transmitting technology, interactions with higher-income countries may have a more beneficial impact than interactions
with similar- or lower-income countries. On the other hand, technology from countries that
are richer or poorer may not be appropriate to the country, so that technology adoption from
countries that are more different may be below that adopted from more similar countries.
Thus, we expect all trade flows to positively influence growth or to have no impact, but form
36
37

This variable is often suggested as a measure of openness; see, for example, Quah and Rauch, 1990. Yet the
trade share will differ between small and large countries even if neither imposes any barriers to trade. Thus,
this variable is not an appropriate measure of openness.
A country with a similar level of per capita income is defined as those twenty countries with per capita incomes
closest to the country in question. This form of measurement may introduce some bias. Consider trade with
rich countries by poor countries and vice versa. For those countries that are at the bottom or top of the per
capita income ranking, trade with poorer or richer countries, respectively, will be zero, since there are no poorer
or richer countries, and trade with richer or poorer countries, respectively, will be high since there are a large
number of richer and poorer countries, respectively. If countries will low per capita incomes grow more slowly
than countries with high per capita incomes (as shown by a correlation of 0.20, significant at the 5% level), then
the bias described above suggests that we should find a negative coefficient on imports and exports from rich
countries and a positive coefficient on imports and exports from poor countries. While we do find the predicted
signs for imports from richer and from poorer countries, we find the opposite sign for exports to richer and to
poorer countries. This suggests that we are picking up more than the relationship induced by our measurement
approach.
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no expectations regarding the relationship between magnitudes.
We empirically analyze the effect of trade preferences on growth in several different
ways. First, non-reciprocal trade blocs. The former colonies of European Union member
countries have been granted preferential, non-reciprocal access to the European .Union since
the 1970s under the Lome and Yaounde conventions. These countries are identified with a
dummy variable labeled "Lome." Preferential, non-reciprocal access was granted in order to
benefit these countries, so we expect a positive coefficient on this variable. We also control
for membership in reciprocal trade blocs. First, we identify countries which are members of
any type of formal trade bloc with a dummy variable. 38 In addition, we control for the type
of trade blocs: trade preferences associations, free trade areas, and customs unions. 39 ,40 The
results of Rivera-Batiz and Romer suggest that we should find a positive coefficient on these
variables.
We also control for some characteristics of trade blocs. First we consider a measure
of the size of the trade bloc. For example, we might well expect that membership in a small
trade bloc would have a smaller impact on growth than membership in a larger trade bloc,
given that one theoretically suggested source of growth upon integration is economies of scale;
such an effect would be larger for larger trade blocs. We measure the size of the trade bloc
excluding the country's size by the total GDP of the bloc less the GDP of the country itself.
The idea is to measure the extent to which joining the bloc increases the effective market for
an individual country, as a larger market can facilitate the exploitation of economies to scale
and increasing the return to R&D, in turn leading to faster growth. Finally, we attempt to
control for the likelihood of trade creation versus trade diversion. To do so, we include the
standard deviation of per capita incomes within a trade bloc. Intuitively, a more diverse
trade bloc increases the likelihood that the trade bloc will result in trade creation rather
38 We also attempted to use separate dummy variables indicating membership in each individual trade bloc. In
general the estimated coefficients were insignificant.
39 As defined by Fieleke, 1992, a trade preferences association is a rather casual trade bloc which establishes lower
barriers against imports from members than from non-members. A free trade area eliminates barriers imposed
against other members, while a customs union also establishes a common tariff imposed against imports from
non-members.
40 No country for which we have data is a member of a formal common market.
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than trade diversion, which should lead to increased technology diffusion. Thus, we expect
to find a positive coefficient on this variable.
In order to take advantage of the cross-sectional and time-series variation in the
data, we would ideally use a GLS, random effects estimation technique which optimally
utilizes the cross-sectional and time-series variation in the data. However, this approach
requires that the country-specific error,

Vi,

be independent of the regressors; otherwise the

coefficient estimates are biased and inconsistent. Hausman specification tests soundly reject
this assumption. 41 We employ the fixed effects (within) estimator, which does not require
this independence assumption. 42

V. The Data
Most of the data are from the Penn World Table (5.6) data set, the most commonly
used data set for empirical work on growth. 43 Human capital stock data are from Barro
and Lee (1996). Data on foreign direct investment are obtained from the IMF's Interna-

tional Financial Statistics. Data on trade flows is from the World Bank's Direction of Trade
Statistics for 1970-1990. Additional data used in calculating the index of home bias were
compiled from the World Almanac. The Penn World Table data are based on annual observations from 1950-1992, while the data in Barra-Lee data set are presented quinquennially
from 1960-1990. Thus, we must use five-year time intervals since the human capital data is
only available every five years. 44 Finally, the data cover 1970 to 1989; the sample is chosen
as the longest time period for which all variables are available for the widest selection of
countries. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the variables included in the regression
analysis. Because we are interested in comparing growth equations with different international integration variables, we limit the analysis to the same set of observations on the 74
countries for which data is available from all sources. This leaves us with a sample of 224
41
42
43
44

We report the results of the Hausman test in table 3.
Harrison, 1996, also adopts a fixed effects approach.
See Summers and Heston, 1991, for a description.
Islam, 1995, discusses other reasons why yearly time spans are too short for investigating growth.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Mean

Std. Dev.

Minimum

Maximum

7.55

14.00

-38.25

61.42

$5,731

$4,611

$506

$18,095

19.01

8.03

1.20

42.04

17.47

6.94

7.62

40.24

7.10

4.65

-3.61

17.18

1.46

1.04

0.03

5.07

Incoming FDI Share

6.14

9.72

0.01

96.02

Home Bias
Trade Share
M Share from Richer Ctries
M Share from Similar Ctries
M Share from Poorer Ctries
X Share from Richer Ctries
X Share from Similar Ctries
X Share from Poorer Ctries
Member of Trade Bloc
Lome Country
Member of TPA 3
Member of FTA
Member of CD
Ag. Size of Rest Bloc Income4
Std. Dev. of Members' Incomes

5.38

1.99

0.64

9.78

65.59

45.04

12.15

378.22

23.97

20.82

0.00

102.28

8.06

11.43

0.01

66.86

3.88

7.63

0.00

65.66

17.18

14.69

0.00

76.46

6.81
5.69

10.14

0.00

8.24

0.00

56.62
70.16

0.99

0.68

0

3

0.21

0.41

0

1

0.24

0.49

0

2

0.47
0.22

0.60

0

2

0.41

1

$1,221

$2,128

0
$0

$8,763

1969.35

1957.78

0.00

9413.50

Per Capita GDP Growth l
Initial per Capita Income
Investment Share
Government Share
Population Growth
Initial Male Sec.

Observations

Schooling 2

224

lOver five year periods.
2The average number of years of secondary education attained by males over 25 years of age.
3Trade preferences association.
4In millions of constant dollars.

observations, spanning the countries listed in table 2.
Information on trade blocs is derived from 'a variety of sources. A table of preferential
trade areas is included in the appendix. The table reveals a pattern of trade agreements
formed between countries that are similar in location and development, with the exception
of the Yaounde and Lome conventions and the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act.
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Table 2: Sample of Countries
The Americas

Europe

Argentina
Guyana
Barbados
Haiti
Bolivia
Honduras
Brazil
Mexico
Canada
Panama
Chile
Paraguay
Peru
Colombia
Costa Rica
Trinidad and Tobago
Dominican Republic
United States
Ecuador
Uruguay
EI Salvador
Venezuela
Guatemala
Africa
Algeria
Benin
Cameroon
Egypt
The Gambia
Ghana
Kenya
Malawi

Austria
Cyprus
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Iceland
Ireland
Italy

Netherlands
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Turkey
United Kingdom

Asia-Oceania
Mali
Mauritius
Senegal
Sierra Leone
Togo
Tunisia
Zambia

Australia
China
Fiji
Indonesia
Israel
Japan
Jordan
Korea

Malaysia
New Zealand
Pakistan
Papua New Guine
Philippines
Singapore
Sri Lanka
Thailand

These latter trade arrangements occurred between developed and developing countries, and
were negotiated primarily to aid the developing countries, granting them preferential, nonreciprocal, access to the EU and the United States, respectively. While the table lists all
trade blocs that have been attempted, there is wide consensus that several have been quite
unsuccessful. In particular, the Central American Common Market in its later days, the Latin
American Free Trade Area, the Economic Community of Western African States, ASEAN,
the Customs and Economic Union of Central Africa, the Andean Pact, the Preferential
Trade Area for Eastern and Southern African States, the Southern African Development
Coordination Conference, and the Communaute Economique de l'Afrique de l'Oest, are
commonly mentioned as failed attempts at integration. Therefore we also try eliminating
these trade blocs from the analysis, but the results are largely unchanged. We therefore
report only the results including all trade blocs, given that the term "failure" is applied in
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an arbitrary manner.

VI. Results
Our results are presented in Table 3. The fit is reasonably good, and the fixed effects
are always jointly significant. 45 The baseline regression, which does not include any controls
for international integration is given in column (1). Column (2) includes a control for inward
FDI; columns (3)-(5) incorporate aspects of trade and openness. Columns (6)-(10) present·
regressions controlling for aspects of trade blocs, and column (11) gives the results obtained
when all three aspects of international integration are included. We present the results in
piecemeal fashion as well as comprehensively to illustrate the biases that may result when
other aspects of international interactions are omitted from the growth regression.
We find evidence of convergence across the 74 countries in the sample, given that
the coefficient on lagged income is significantly negative in all models. This suggests that
countries with low initial income levels grow more quickly than countries with higher initial
income levels. We also consistently find that the investment share contributes positively to
growth, while the share of government expenditures contribute negatively to growth. The
average number of years of secondary and higher schooling generally positively effects growth,
but is rarely significant. 46 Finally, population growth is negative in all specifications, but is
also rarely significant. 47
Inclusion of the first measure of international integration, the log of inward foreign
direct investment, significantly increases the growth rate, as expected. 48

Inclusion of FDI

45 In the interests of brevity, we, omit the fixed effect results. We also report the results from a Hausman
specification-test which indicate that, for all models and at extreme significance, the variables are correlated
with the country-specific error term, so that random effects are inappropriate.
46 de Mello, 1997, notes, that using standard measures of human capital accumulation may riot be good at
explaining the externalities and spillover effects of human capital stocks. This may explain the statistical
insignificance of our result.
47 This lack of significance may be largely driven by outliers. When Guyana, Austria, Belgium-Luxembourg,
Denmark, Finland, Germany, and the UK are omitted (all of which have abnormally low population growth),
population growth remains negative and becomes significant.
48 We also tried adding an interaction term between human capital and foreign direct investment. The idea is
that foreign direct investment will have a more positive effect on growth the more educated the work force of
the host country, as the more educated the work force, the more technology that will be absorbed by the host
country. While the results support the hypothesis, the variable is very unevenly distributed, with the United
States and Canada having values several times the mean.
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(1)

(2)

-

-

-

Log Openness
Log Exp to Rich
Log Exp to Same
Log Exp to Poor
Log Imp from Rich

(3)

( 0.028)
( 0.029)

-

-

-

-

Log Imp from Same
Log Imp from Poor
St.dev. of
Mmhr Incomes
Bloc Size
Trade Bloc Mmhr

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

PTA
FTA
Customs Union
Lome Ctry

0.43
3.46
S7.92

-

-

0.47
3.12
7S.79

-

-

-

0.45
3.76
95.36

O.4S
4.11
141.43

0.125
( 0.120)

0.152

( 0.0'2)

0.095'

( 0.038)

0.103'"

( 0.040)

0.007

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

( 0.042)

0.OS3"

( O.OlS)

-0.015

( 0.029)

0.047'

( 0.071)

0.45
3.90
97.46

( 0.076)

'0.240'"

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

( 0.041)

0.106'"

( O.OlS)

-0.014

( 0.028)

0.017

( 0.072)

-0.21S"·

( 0.0'7)

-0.24S"·

-0.523'"

( o.osa)

(S)

-0.522'"

(7)

( 0.117)

-

-

-

( 0.028)

0.059"

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

( 0.042)

0.119'"

( O.OlS)

-0.019

( 0.029)

0.041

( 0.073)

-0.240'"

( 0.0'9)

-0.531'"

(6)

-

( 0.033)

0.022

( 0.036)

0.043

( 0.048)

-0.143'"

( 0.032)

-0.027

( 0.032)

-0.015

( 0.049)

0.161'"

-

( 0.043)

0.130'"

( O.OlS)

-0.019

( 0.028)

0.029

( 0.080)

-0.130

( 0.061)

-0.523'"

(5)

"', .. , " represent significance at the one, five and ten percent level, respectively.
(base) indicates that the value used in the regression is from the first year of each five year grouping.

0.44
3.73
90.3S

-

-

-

-

0.47
3.95
100.44

-

-

-

0.42
3.54
S1.75

-

-

R 2 Within
F-test'"
Hausman-test'"

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

( 0.031)

0.112"

-

( 0.044)

0.061

( O.OlS)

-0.023

-

-

( 0.033)

0.OS2"

-

( 0.041)

0.094"

( O.OlS)

-0.017

0.017

( 0.073)

( 0.070)

0.022

-0.211'"

( 0.0'7)

-0.502'"

(4)

-0.220'"

( 0.068)

-0.40S"·

-

( 0.011)

-

Horne Bias

0.041'"

( 0.040)

( 0.042)

-

0.073'

( 0.017)

0.093"

( Om8)

( 0.028)

-0.024

( 0.028)

-0.027

0.007

( 0.072)

( 0.074)

0.032

-0.176"

( 0.0'")

-0.51S·"

-0.224'"

( 0.0'8)

-0.496'"

Log Inward FDI

Log Darn. Inv.

Log Pop. Growth

(64'.)

Male Secondary Ed.

Log Gov't Exp.

(bu~)

Log GDP

(Standard etrofl in parentheu•. )

Fixed Effects Results

Table 3

0.49
4.35
l1S.03

-

( 0.06')

0.301'"

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

( 0.039)

0.106'"

( 0.017)

-0.011

( 0.027)

0.009

( 0.069)

-0.21S"·

( 0.0,")

-0.542'"

(9)

II

(

(

(

(

-

(

(

-

(

-

significantly reduces the estimated coefficient on domestic investment (by 22%). We expect
that the larger estimated coefficient on domestic investment when FDI is omitted is due
to the correlation between the two variables. 49 The two forms of investment will both be
motivated, at least in part, by the same factors (e.g., a good return on investment). Thus,
when FDI is omitted, the estimated coefficient on domestic investment will pick up not only
its direct effect on growth, but also will reflect the influence of FDI on growth rates.
We next consider the effect of trade and openness on growth. The estimated effect
of "Home Bias," the variable broadly measuring how closed a country

IS, IS

surprIsmg.

Rather than being negative, as expected, it is positive and significant. In contrast, the
effect of trade share, often used as a measure of openness, reported in column (4), indicates
that more openness (less closedness) leads to higher growth. 50 However, from table A2 we
see that the measure of how closed the economy is, home bias, is statistically significantly
positively correlated (at 0.33) with the trade share. While at first a positive correlation
may seem counterintuitive, consider the following. Trade share is determined not only by
trade barriers, but also by natural characteristics of the country (e.g., factor endowments
relative to world endowments, distance from other countries, etc.). Countries that naturally

(i.e., in the absence of policy) would have large trade shares may be precisely the most
likely countries to impose trade barriers. Then a higher home bias will not only indicate
that a country is closed but will also indicate a country with a large trade share. Thus, the
coefficient on home bias may be picking up primarily the positive influence of trade share on
growth, given the positive correlation between home bias and trade share.
Finally, we consider the source of imports and exports; that is, we disaggregate the
trade share variable into exports and imports to/from countries with higher incomes, similar
incomes, and lower incomes. Only trade to and from richer countries is significant, which is
largely consistent with theory. However, imports from richer countries are estimated to re49 Table A3 in the appendix shows that FDI and domestic investment are statistically significantly correlated,
with a correlation coefficient of 0.54.
50 In addition, studies which have considered alternative measures of openness, in particular Harrison, 1996, also
show that more openness leads to higher growth.
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duce growth, while exports to rich countries are associated with higher growth. Endogenous
growth theories that incorporate international trade suggest that imports should lead to diffusion of technology and hence growth. One explanation is that the goods that are imported
from richer countries do not embody the technology that is appropriate for poorer countries.
For example, comparative advantage and casual empiricism suggest that imports from richer
countries will embody technology that relies heavily on capital (physical or human), while
poorer countries are relatively well endowed with unskilled labor. If recipient countries adopt
the inappropriate technology, their growth rates may fall. Alternatively, imports from richer
countries may be processed in the recipient country and then re-exported. Then the effect of
imports on growth is embodied not only in the coefficient on imports, but also in part by the
coefficient on exports. That is, though the partial derivative is negative, the total derivative
is positive. 51 Unfortunately we do not have sufficient data on processing and re-exporting
to verify this hypothesis.
Consider now the variables relating to trade blocs. Columns (6) and (7) consider how
simple membership in a trade bloc may affect growth. We find evidence that belonging to
a trade bloc significantly increases growth. 52 Having preferential, non-reciprocal access to
the EU through the Lome convention is insignificant, though positive as one might expect. 53
Column (7) separates membership by type of trade bloc. We find that membership in a
free trade area or a customs union significantly increases growth, though membership in a
trade preferences association, the least integrated, least formal type of trade bloc, has no
significant impact on growth.
We then consider how characteristics of the trade bloc may affect growth. We consider two aspects of a trade bloc: (log of) the sum of GDP of the bloc members not including
51 Henry Wan suggested this explanation in private communication.
52 We also tried including a separate dummy variable for each trade blocs, but in general none were significant.
In addition, note from the descriptive statistics in table 1 that a country may belong to more than one trade
bloc, in which case our dummy variable indicating membership in a trade bloc will take a value higher than 1.
We also estimate the equation with a dummy variable equal to 1 if a country belongs to at least 1 trade bloc
and 0 otherwise; the results are unchanged.
53 Many of the Lome countries are omitted from the sample because information on other variables, especially
foreign direct investment, is missing. This may explain the insignificance.
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the member country and the standard deviation of member incomes.

The former is ex-

pected to measure the possibility of returns to scale in R&D (given a larger market) and
the latter to measure the likelihood of trade creation rather than diversion. When each is
included separately, we find a statistically significantly positive effect. However, when both
are included, only the latter effect is significant.
Finally, consider the results in column (11), which include controls for FDI, for trade
flows from richer, similar, and poorer countries, and the standard deviation of trade bloc·
members income. All of the international variables remain robust in terms of sign and
significance, though the magnitude of the coefficients shrink somewhat. The latter effect
is due to the fact that the variables are correlated, so that omitting them in the initial
regressions caused the included variables to pick up the effect of the omitted variables. The
overall fit is improved. Thus, we conclude that controlling for all forms of international
integration is important. While omitting some forms will not lead to wrong inferences with
regard to sign and significance, magnitudes will be overstated, as estimated coefficients pick
up the effects of omitted variables as well as the direct effect of the regressor.

VII. Conclusions
In this paper, we have provided examples of theoretical propositions regarding the
influence of international interactions on growth, a summary of the empirical evidence of
these interactions, and evidence of the importance not only of international transactions for
growth, but the importance of measuring these interactions comprehensively. What we found
i,n the empirical literature is a piecemeal approach to addressing the issue of international
interactions and growth. There are a variety of mechanisms through which active engagement
with the rest of the world can facilitate growth. Our evidence reveals that indicators of
openness, integration, FDI, and preferential treatment are sufficiently correlated that an
analysis of one in the absence of the others is not meaningful. To date, the literature lacks
a single study incorporating these various influences and hence fails to provide an adequate

24

picture of how international interactions contribute to growth, especially, with respect to
magnitude.
We have also identified areas of the literature that remain under-explored. In particular, the influence of preferential trading arrangements of one sort or another on growth is
currently an open question. Theory gives ambiguous predictions: depending on the model,
regional integration may increase or decrease gr~wth or have no influence at all. The empirical evidence, what little exists, is also ambiguous. The importance of this question is .
clear when one attempts to understand the motivation for arrangements such as Lome, the
Generalized System of Preferences, and the Caribbean Basin Initiative of the United States.
These programs are rationalized as promoting growth in less developed regions by granting
liberal access to developed markets. While there is evidence that trade preferences do facilitate trade between participating countries, the consequences for growth are neither well
understood nor well explored.
Finally, our empirical work employs a single dataset and econometric technique in an
effort to consistently examine the several potential contributors of international engagement
to growth. We find broad support for the notion that trade, FDI, and regional integration
generally contribute to growth in per capita incomes in the 1970s and 1980s. We present resuIts for each mechanism separately and together in order to illustrate the robustness of the
I

results to omitted variable bias. Our results can be broadly characterized as follows: trading
more, but with the right countries, foreign direct investment, and trade preferences between.
countries with disparate incomes lead to enhanced growth of per capita incomes. In addition,
a comprehensive regression reveals that these results continue to hold, but with somewhat
reduced strength. The estimated magnitudes of the effect of the statistically significant vari'abIes fall by 15 to 30% when all forms of international interactions are included. This result
highlights the importance of a comprehensive (versus piecemeal) analysis of international
interactions and growth.
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Appendix
Table A3: Preferential Trading Arrangements Through 1989
Year l

Countries

Trade Bloc
Southern African Customs Unions** (SACU)
1910
1990

South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland
Namibia

European Union** (EEC, EC, EU)
1958
1973
1973
1981
1986

Belgium, Luxembourg, France, the Netherlands, W. Germany, Italy
EU and EFTA implement free trade between areas.*
Britain, Ireland, Denmark
Greece
Portugal and Spain

European Free Trade Association* (EFTA)
1960
1970
1973
1973
1986
1986

Austrip., Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Britain
Iceland
Denmark and Britain withdraw.
EU and EFTA implement free trade between areas.*
Portugal withdraws.
Finland

Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA)*'+
1961
1970s
1981

Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela
Effectively fails.
Reformulated as Latin American Integration Association, a trade preferences association, with original members.

Central American Common Market* (CACM)
1961
1962
1963

EI Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua
Honduras
Costa Rica

African Common Market** CACM)
1962

Algeria, United Arab Republic, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, and Morocco

Yaounde and Lome conventions 2
1964 (YI)

1971 (YII)
1973 (YII)
1976 (LI)

1976 (LI)
1977 (LI)
1978 (LI)

Between EEC and former French, Belgian, and Italian colonies in Africa: Burundi,
Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Cote de Ivoire, Benin,
Burkina Faso, Gabon, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal,
Somalia, and Togo.
Convention extended.
Mauritius
Lome supercedes Yaounde. Extended to Britain's former colonies in Africa and all
former colonies in the Caribbean and Pacific: Bahamas, Barbados, Botswana
Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau
Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Nigeria, Sierra
Leone, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda,
Upper Volta, Western Samoa, Zaire, Zambia
Suriname, Seychelles, Comoros
Sao Tome, Principe, Cape Verde, Papua New Guinea
Djibouti, Solomon Islands
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Table AI: Correlations Among International Variables
H
0

m
e
F
D
I
Home Bias
Trade Shr*
Rich X*
Same X*
Poor X*
Rich M*
Same M*
Poor M*
Lome
Any Bloc
PTA
FTA
CU
Bloc Std.
Bloc Size

-.83
-.19
-.52
.47
.40
-.55
.42
.45
-.56

-.19
.14
.36
.41

B

T
r
a
d
e

R
i
c
h

S
a
m
e

a
s

S
h
r

X

X

.33
.72
-.57
-.46
.76
-.51
-.48
.61

.40
.32
.41
.44
.40
.44
.23

-.55
-.36
.93
-.51
-.37
.38

-.57
.91
.69
-.29

.29

-.24

1

.17
-.20
-.33
-.40

-.20

P
0
0

r

R
i
c
h

S
a
m
e

X

M

M

-.32
.75
.88
-.19
-,.15

-.47
-.34
.37

.77
-.27

.18

-.30

A
n
y

P
0
0

B

1

0

c
L

r

0

M

m
e

B

1

0

c

P
T
A

F
T
A

C
U

.18
.66

.53
.78

.71

.28
.34
.41

.17
.16

-.14
-.19
-.23

.27
.31
.37

-.23
-.15
-.19
.17
.23
.25

.18

.14
-.20
-.27

A blank entry indicates that the correlation was not significant at the 5% level.
*In logs.
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.35
.59
.27
.56
.26

-.24
-.26
.16

S
t
d

Table A2: Correlations between International
and Control Variables
Initial
GDP

Govt.
Share

Initial
Sec. Ed.

0.67 -0.41
FDI Share*
0.50
-0.81
0.48
-0.61
Home Bias
Trade Share*
0.25
-0.56
X Sh. to Richer*
-0.63
0.27
X Sh. to Same*
0.74 -0.19
0.57
X Sh. to Poorer*
0.69 -0.29
0.56
-0.66
0.31
-0.55
M Sh. to Richer*
0.77 -0.19
0.61
M Sh. to Same*
M Sh. to Poorer*
0.72 -0.30
0.58
-0.52
0.44
-0.38
Lome
0.13
Member of Trade Bloc
-0.19
Member of PTA
-0.14
0.18
Member of FTA
0.22
Member of CD
0.35
0.22
Bloc Std. Dev. Income
0.38
0.17
Bloc Size
A blank entry indicates that the correlation was not significant at
*In logs.
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Pop.
Growth

Invest.
Share

-0.40
0.52

0.54
-0.63

0.44
-0.62
-0.48
0.45
-0.63
-0.52
0.24

-0.32
0.48
0.46
-0.35
0.42
0.47
-0.54
-0.30

0.23
-0.29
-0.45
-0.44
-0.53
the 5% level.

0.19
0.21

Yaounde and Lome conventions continued
1979
1980
1981
1981
1982
1986
1986

(LI)
(LI)
(LII)
(LII)
(LII)
(LIII)
(LIII)

Tuvalu, Dominica, St. Lucia, Kiribati
St. Vincent and the Grenadines
Convention extended.
Vanuatu
Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, and Zimbabwe
Convention extended.
Mozambique

Australia/New Zealand Free Trade Area· (ANZERTA)
1966
1983

Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Area
Becomes Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement

Arab Common Market· (ARABCM)
1965

Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Syria

Automobile Products Trade Agreement (Auto Pact)
1965

- Canada, the United States

U.K.-Ireland Free Trade Area·
1966.

United Kingdom, Ireland

Communaute Economique de I'Afrique de I'Oest· (CEAO)
1959
1966
1984

Customs Unions of Western African States predecessor.
Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal
Benin

Customs and Economic Union of Central Africa· (VDEAC)
1962
1966
1985

Equatorial Customs Union predecessor.
Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Gabon
Equatorial Guinea

East African Community (EAC)
1967
1977

Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda
Collapsed

Association of Southeast Asian Nations+ (ASEAN)
1967
1977
1984

Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand
Becomes a trade preferences association.
Brunei

Andean Pact· (ANDEAN)
1969
1976
1988

Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela
Chile exits
Andean Group" formed with all original members.

Caribbean Community and Common Market" (CARICOM)
1968
1973
1974
1983

Caribbean Free Trade Assocation (CARIFTA) predecessor; Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Guyana, and Trinidad and Tobago.
Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago
Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Kitts-Nevis, St. Lucia,
and St. Vincent and the Grenadines
Bahamas

Mano River Union··· (MRU)
1973
1980

Liberia, Sierra Leone
Guinea

Economic Community of Western African States· (ECOWAS)
1975

Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d'Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, GuineaBissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo
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Economic Community of the Countries of the Great Lakes* (CEPGL)
1976

Burundi, Rwanda, Zaire

Bangkok Agreement+
1976

Bangladesh, India, Laos, Philippines, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Thailand

Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC)
1980
1990

Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland
Namibia

Communaute Economique des Etats de I'Afrique Centrales** (CEEAC)
1981

Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Equatorial Guinea,
Gabon, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Zaire

Organization of Eastern Caribbean States*** (OECS)
1981

Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Kitts-Nevis, St. Lucia,
St. Vincent and Grenadines, British Virgin Islands

Gulf Cooperation Council+ (GCC)
1983

Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates

Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern African States+ (PTA)
1984

Angola, Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique,
Mauritius, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Tanzania, Zambia,
Zimbabwe

Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act 3
1984

Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Costa Rica, Dominica, Dominican
Republic, EI Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Montserrat, Netherlands Antilles, Nicaragua, Panama, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia,
St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago, British Virgin Islands

United States-Israel Free Trade Area Agreement*
1985

United States, Israel

South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation4 (SAARC)
1985

Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka

Canada-US Free Trade Agreement* (CUSFTA)
1989

Canada, the United States

Arab Maghreb Union** (AMU)
1989

Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia

Sources: Adapted from de la Torre and Kelly (1992), EI-Agraa (1994), Lawrence (1996), Nadal de Simone (1995),
Whalley (1991), Whalley and Hamilton (1997), WTO (1995).
1 Year agreement went into effect. Typically the agreement is signed a year or two prior.
2 There were two Yaounde conventions and three Lome conventions through 1989, indicated by YI, YIl, Ll, LIl,
and LIll. The conventions granted non-reciprocal access to the EU market.
3 Grants non-reciprocal access to the U.S.
4 Became a trade preferences association in 1991.
+,*,**,*** Trade preferences association, free trade area, customs union, and common market, respectively.
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